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Over the last decades, increase in capital mobility has lead to a sharp rise in FDIs
and multinational activity, thereby creating the conditions for international tax
competition.1 As shown in Figure 1, among the 106 countries surveyed by KPMG
(2009), the average of corporate statutory tax rates (All) has fallen from 31.4 to
25.9% over the 1999-2008 period. While tax cuts were less pronounced in Latin
American (LAT) and Asian Paci￿c (ASPAC) countries, much more dramatic tax
cuts occurred in industrialized countries: in the EU, for example, the decrease
was sharper (i.e., from 34.2 to 23.2%). We can therefore say that, due to tax
competition, ￿rms have been operating in a tax-rate-cut scenario where further
reductions might occur in the future.2
Despite this generalized tax-cut policies, the recent world crisis has lead politi-
cians to discuss a possible tax rate increase aimed at ￿nancing the policies im-
plemented to o⁄set the dramatic e⁄ects of the 2008-2009 recession.3 As pointed
out by Mintz (1995, p. 61): ￿ When capital is sunk, governments may have the
irresistible urge to tax such a capital at a high rate in the future. This endo-
geneity of government decisions results in a problem of time consistency in tax
policy, whereby governments may wish to take actions in the future that would
be di⁄erent from what would be originally planned￿ . In this case, the commit-
ment failure leads to the well-known "capital levy problem", which is related to
a ￿rm￿ s fear that a government can decide to raise taxes on capital already in-
vested.4 Firms are aware that the government can take a di⁄erent action from
that initially planned and try to anticipate its tax choices.
1See, e.g., Devereux et al. (2008) and Ghinamo et al. (2009).
2KPMG experts add that "we have found no country anywhere that has raised its rate since
last year" (KPMG 2009, p. 6).
3The sharp increase in public de￿cits throughout the world will probably be tackled not only
by cutting public spending but also by increasing tax rates. Some US States (such as Oregon
and Illinois) have already planned or are planning to raise statutory tax rates. Similarly, public
budget concerns in the Eurozone make tax rate increases more likely in some countries.






















Figure 1: A Tax Rate Comparison by Global Region, 1999-2008.
Kpmg (2009).
Whatever the sign of the tax rate change is, the empirical evidence shows
that tax rate changes are not only frequent but also are di¢ cult to foresee by
taxpayers. This means that tax changes are a source of uncertainty.
Tax uncertainty is a fairly important problem and must be analyzed with
appropriate techniques. Over the last decade, scholars have used the real-option
approach to deal with tax uncertainty.5 Hassett and Metcalf (1999) used a model
with an output price following a geometric Brownian motion and an uncertain
investment tax credit to explain the e⁄ects of tax policy uncertainty on aggregate
investment. They concluded that tax policy uncertainty tends to delay investment
under a continuous-time random walk, but increases the capital stock under a
Poisson jump process.
B￿hm and Funke (2000) showed that investment is not very sensitive to the
degree of tax policy uncertainty, when capital is gradually accumulated. Agliardi
(2001) analyzed investment e⁄ects of uncertain investment tax credits following a
jump-di⁄usion process. She found that tax policy uncertainty delays investment.
B￿ckem (2001) studied whether the threat of imposing a sales tax can lead to a
systematic delay of investment. In a dynamic investment model with demand and
tax uncertainty, she showed that no systematic delay of investment is expected
5As argued by Pindyck (2007): "sunk costs do matter in decision-making when those costs
have yet to be sunk￿ . This implies that the e⁄ects of tax uncertainty must be analyzed from
an ex-ante perspective, i.e., when ￿rms are still free to choose not only whether but also when
to invest.
2to occur.
Panteghini (2001a, 2001b) used a Poisson process for the tax rate and proved
that investment may be una⁄ected by tax policy uncertainty, if an ACE-type
system is applied. Niemann (2004) de￿ned two neutrality conditions: ￿rst-order
neutrality, which requires the complete ine⁄ectiveness of taxation on investment
decisions; second-order neutrality, which means that the stochastic nature of
taxation does not alter investment decisions. In a subsequent article (Niemann,
2006), he analyzed combined tax rate and tax base uncertainty by assuming a
stochastic tax payment. He showed that the uncertainty of tax payments has an
ambiguous impact on investment timing.6 Recently, Chen and Funke (2008) have
found that political uncertainty (including discontinuous changes in taxation)
discourages FDI decisions.
It is worth noting that all these articles deal with tax uncertainty by assum-
ing fully equity-￿nanced investment decisions. However, the evidence shows that
investment and ￿nancial decisions are related and, hence, should be jointly ana-
lyzed. To provide a more realistic analysis, therefore, we depart from the relevant
literature and let a ￿rm borrow optimally. Given the importance that the statu-
tory tax rate has on ￿nancial choices (see, e.g., Leland, 1994), we will focus on
tax rate uncertainty. Moreover, since the evidence shows that tax rate changes
are discrete, we will describe them with a Poisson process. In doing so, we will be
able to study two possible scenarios: a standard capital-levy one, where the tax
rate is expected to rise, and a tax-competition one, where there is a downward
trend in tax rates.
Given this model, we will prove that debt ￿nance not only encourages invest-
ment activities but also can substantially mitigate the e⁄ect of tax rate uncer-
tainty on investment timing. In particular, using a numerical simulation, based
on realistic parameter values, we will show that a highly volatile tax system may
have a negligible impact on investment choices, if ￿rms can choose their capital
structure. If however, they are credit-constrained the impact of tax-rate uncer-
tainty is much more signi￿cant. Our results have implications in terms of both
empirical analysis and policy decision-making. Firstly, we can say that economet-
ric investigation should control for the existence (absence) of ￿nancial ￿ exibility.
Otherwise, estimates would be misleading. Secondly, the e⁄ects of a hot policy
debate on future (and uncertain) tax-rate changes crucially depend on the e¢ -
ciency of ￿nancial market and, in particular, on the existence/absence of credit
constraints.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 shows our main ￿ndings and discusses how tax rate uncertainty a⁄ects a ￿rm￿ s
choices. Section 4 summarizes our main ￿ndings and discusses its implications.
6On this point see also Sureth (2002).
32 The model
In this section we introduce an EBIT-based model in the spirit of Goldstein et
al. (2001). By focusing on cash ￿ ows rather than stocks, we can better describe
the investment and ￿nancial strategies of an in￿nitely-lived risk-neutral ￿rm.7
Let us denote ￿t as the ￿rm￿ s Earning Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) at
time t and assume that it evolves as follows:
d￿t
￿t
= ￿dt + ￿dzt, with ￿0 ￿ 0; (1)
where ￿ is the expected rate of growth, ￿ is the instantaneous standard deviation
of d￿t
￿t and dzt is the increment of a Brownian motion. Moreover, let us introduce
the following hypotheses.
Assumption 1 The ￿rm must pay a sunk start-up cost, denoted by I, to under-
take a risky project.
Assumption 2 The ￿rm can borrow from a perfectly competitive risk-neutral
credit sector, characterized by a given risk-free interest rate r.
Assumption 3 The ￿rm can decide how much to borrow by choosing a non-
renegotiable coupon C.
Assumption 4 Default takes place when ￿t goes to C.
Assumption 5 The cost of default is equal to ￿C with ￿ > 0.
According to Assumption 1, the ￿rm must pay a sunk cost. This means that
investment projects are irreversible. Assumption 2 entails a simple framework
where lenders are price-takers and become shareholders in the event of default.
In line with Leland (1994), the ￿rm chooses an optimal coupon (Assumption 3).8
For simplicity, the capital structure is assumed to be static, i.e., ￿nancial policy
cannot be reviewed later.9 Moreover, according to Assumption 4, default occurs
7For a study on risk-averse ￿rms￿investment choices, see Niemann and Sureth (2004, 2005).
8Given C and the risk-free interest rate r, the market value of debt can be calculated. It is
worth noting that, in the absence of arbitrage, setting the coupon ￿rst, and then calculating
the market value of debt is equivalent to ￿rst choosing the value of debt and then calculating
the e⁄ective interest rate. The ratio between C and the market value of debt is equal to the
e⁄ective interest rate (which is given by the sum between r and the default risk premium).
9Ruling out the option to renegotiate debt does not a⁄ect the qualitative properties of the
model. For a detailed analysis of dynamic trade-o⁄ strategies, with costly debt renegotiation,
see, e.g., Goldstein et al. (2001), and Hennessy and Whited (2005).
4when the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, net of its debt obligations, is nil.10 When default takes
place, a sunk default cost, equal to ￿C; is faced (Assumption 5).11
Let us next introduce taxation. We de￿ne ￿ as the tax rate and assume
that interest payments are fully deductible. As to the treatment of the lender￿ s
receipts, the evidence shows that e⁄ective tax rates on capital income are fairly
low. With no loss of generality, therefore, we assume that the lender￿ s pre-default
tax burden is nil, so that her after-tax pro￿t function at any instant t is simply
C. When, however, default takes place, the lender becomes shareholder and is
then subject to corporate taxation.
Given these assumptions a ￿rm￿ s after-tax pro￿t function, at time t, is equal
to
￿
N = (1 ￿ ￿t)(￿t ￿ C): (2)
Given Assumption 4 therefore, default takes place when ￿N = 0. This means
that the default threshold point is C.
Let us ￿nally model tax rate uncertainty. We assume that the tax rate follows
a Poisson process. Given an initial tax rate ￿0, at any short time interval dt there
is a probability ￿dt that the tax rate changes to ￿1 (7 ￿0): Hence we can write:
d￿ =
￿
0 w.p. 1 ￿ ￿dt;
￿￿ w.p. ￿dt; (3)
where ￿￿ = ￿1 ￿ ￿0. Given (3), we can therefore focus on:
1. a capital-levy scenario, where the tax rate is expected to rise (i.e., ￿￿ > 0);
2. a tax-competition scenario, where the tax rate is expected to decrease (i.e.,
￿￿ < 0).
For simplicity, hereafter we will omit the time variable t.
2.1 The value function
Let us next calculate the ￿rm￿ s value function. Using a backward approach, we
will ￿rst focus on the value function after the tax rate change: in this case the rel-
evant rate is ￿1 and the value function will be denoted by V1(￿;C). Subsequently,
we will focus on the before-tax-change scenario, where the current statutory rate
is ￿0.
10Assumption 4 implies that debt is protected. As pointed out by Leland (1994) minimum
net-worth requirements, implied by protected debt, are common in short-term debt ￿nancing.
For further details on default conditions see Brennan and Schwartz (1978), and Smith and
Warner (1979). For a comparison between protected and unprotected debt ￿nancing, see also
Panteghini (2007a).
11The quality of results does not change if, like Leland (1994), we assume that default costs
are proportional to a ￿rm￿ s value.
52.1.1 After the tax-rate change
The value function V1(￿;C) is given by the sumbetween the equity value E1(￿;C)
and the debt value D1(￿;C), net of the investment cost I. As shown in Appendix

















￿￿2 ￿ I, before default,
(4)
where ￿ ￿ r￿￿ > 0 is the so-called "dividend yield". The term
(1￿￿1)￿
￿ measures
the gross value of an unlevered ￿rm;12 ￿1C
r is the tax bene￿t due to deductibility














contingent cost of default. In other words, in the event of default, a ￿rm not only
faces a sunk cost ￿C but also loses the tax bene￿t of interest deductibility (
￿1C
r ).




￿￿2, with ￿2 < 0 (see
Appendix A), which measures the contingent value of 1e in the event of default.
2.1.2 Before the tax-rate change
Let us now calculate the value function before the tax rate change, V0(￿;C). As
shown in Appendix A.2, V0(￿;C) is given by the sum of the equity value E0(￿;C)
and the debt value D0(￿;C) before the tax rate change, net of the investment
cost I, i.e.,
V0(￿;C) = E0(￿;C)+D0(￿;C)￿I = V1 (￿;C)+X (￿;C)+Y (￿;C)￿I; (5)
where
X (￿;C) ￿ E0 (￿;C) ￿ E1 (￿;C)



























are the expected changes in the equity and debt value, respectively. The term ￿
￿
C
￿￿2(￿), with ￿2 (￿) < 0 (see again Appendix A), is the contingent value of 1e,
under tax rate uncertainty. As can be seen, the relevant discount rates are ￿ + ￿
and r + ￿ (instead of ￿ and r), respectively. This is due to the fact that, before
the tax-rate jump, present value calculations must account for the probability ￿
of this tax change.
12The relevant discount rate of the ￿rst term is ￿ ￿ r. This means that the present value of
future cash ￿ ow accounts for the expected growth rate ￿ ￿ 0 of ￿.
6It is worth noting that ￿2 (￿) depends on the probability of the tax-rate
change. This implies that the contingent value of default is a⁄ected by tax
uncertainty. To understand this important e⁄ect, let us compare the tax un-








￿￿2(￿) holds. This means that the contingent value of 1e under tax
rate uncertainty is less than that under tax rate certainty.
Both the expected changes in the equity and debt value account for the tax
rate change and are proportional to the di⁄erential (￿1 ￿ ￿0). In particular,
X (￿;C) is given by the product between the tax rate di⁄erential (￿1 ￿ ￿0) and
the term in square brackets, which measures the contingent value of equity: this
















￿￿2(￿) : Function Y (￿;C) measures the impact of the tax-rate
change on the bene￿t of interest deductibility. It is thus equal to the product





￿￿2(￿)), divided by the relevant discount rate (￿ + ￿).
2.2 The option value
Let us next deal with the option to invest. Accordingly, we denote the option value
O1 (￿;C) and O0 (￿;C), under tax rate certainty and uncertainty, respectively.
Again, we will follow a backward approach.
2.2.1 After the tax-rate change
Let us start with the after-change scenario. Since the tax-rate change has already
occurred, policy uncertainty has vanished. As shown in Appendix B.1, the option

























where ￿ ￿ is the threshold EBIT level, above which investment is undertaken. As





present value of 1e contingent on the entry decision, and
"














that is, the Net Present Value (NPV) at point ￿ = ￿ ￿ (i.e., when the investment
project is optimally undertaken).
72.2.2 Before the tax-rate change












￿;C; ￿ ￿; b ￿
￿
; (7)
























measures the contingent e⁄ect of tax-rate uncertainty on the option value (see




and V1(￿ ￿;C) are the value functions at the rele-





is the contingent value





measures the impact of tax
rate uncertainty on the contingent evaluation of assets.13
2.3 The ￿rm￿ s problem
Given the NPV and the option value, let us next analyze a ￿rm￿ s decision on both
the coupon C and the investment timing. Again, we will start with the after-tax
reform, and then focus on the before-tax rate change case.
2.3.1 After the tax-rate change


























































8The threshold point ￿ ￿￿
1 is given by the product between the term 1
1+m1, which





which is the value of the threshold point under full equity ￿nance (see, Pantegh-
ini, 2007a and 2007b). Since 1
1+m1 < 1, debt ￿nancing encourages investment
(namely, induces a ￿rm to invest earlier). The reasoning behind this result is
straightforward: if a ￿rm can borrow, it will invest earlier in order to bene￿t
from interest deductibility (see Panteghini 2007b).
The optimal coupon C1 is proportional to the threshold point ￿ ￿￿
1 and is nega-
tively a⁄ected by the default cost parameter ￿: As shown in Appendix C.2, both
￿ ￿￿
1 and C1 are increasing in ￿1. The positive e⁄ect of ￿1 on the threshold point
￿ ￿￿
1 is due to the fact that the higher the tax rate, the greater the option value is
(i.e., the higher the opportunity cost of immediate investment is), and the lower
the after-tax value of the project is. Both e⁄ects cause a delay in investment. The
positive sign of
@C1
@￿1 means that the higher the rate ￿1, the greater the bene￿t of
interest deductibility, the higher the optimal coupon is. Moreover, we can show






is increasing in ￿1: This means that
a higher tax rate stimulates borrowing for any given level of EBIT.
2.3.2 Before the tax-rate change










￿;C; b ￿; ￿ ￿
￿
is de￿ned by (6), (7) and (8). Solving (11) gives the
following ￿rst order conditions:
@O0
￿









































































9b ￿￿ and C￿ are the solutions of system (12)-(13). Although this it has no closed-
form solution, the analysis of equations (12)-(13) gives us some hint about the
e⁄ects of tax rate uncertainty. To do so, let us start with the tax-certainty



























go to zero. In this case the two-equation system (12)-(13) collapses to the tax-rate
certainty system (48)-(49) (in Appendix C.1), with the relevant tax rate ￿0.
This ￿rst step allows us to show that terms (14) and (15) measure the dis-
tortions caused by tax-rate uncertainty. In particular, term (14) measures the
marginal distortion on the threshold EBIT level. As can be seen, (14) is propor-










: while former measures the contingent value of
1e invested when ￿ reaches ￿ ￿; i.e., when it is optimal to invest in the absence
of tax-rate uncertainty, the latter measures the wedge on contingent evaluation






the tax-rate-uncertainty trigger point b ￿ and on the di⁄erence [￿1 (￿) ￿ ￿1]: This
means that the higher the parameter ￿, the larger the tax-rate uncertainty wedge
is, or equivalently, the greater the distortion caused by tax-rate uncertainty.
A similar reasoning holds for term (15), which enters Eq. (13). As can be seen,
the marginal condition on the coupon depends on the marginal bene￿t of debt
￿nancing, after the tax-rate change (i.e.,
@V1(￿ ￿;C)
@C ). Moreover, it is proportional
















has two opposing e⁄ects on Equations (12)-(13):
while it raises the LHS of (12), it reduces the LHS of (13). As will be shown
in the next section, this opposing e⁄ect will lead to an increase in the marginal
cost of immediate investment and, at the same time, a drop in the marginal cost
of debt ￿nance.
3 A numerical analysis
In order to analyze how a ￿rm￿ s ability to borrow a⁄ects investment decisions,
let us compare the tax-uncertainty scenario with the tax-certainty one. In both
10cases, we assume that the starting tax rate is ￿0. While in the tax-certainty case
it will be unchanged, under tax-rate uncertainty this rate is expected to jump
(either up or down).
Under tax-rate certainty, the ￿rm￿ s problem is equivalent to (9), with the
assumption that here, the relevant tax rate is ￿0 (instead of ￿1). Hence, its





























Since solutions (16) have the same form as solutions (10), the comparative statics
results of Appendix C.2 (on solutions solutions (10)) still hold. In other terms,







increasing in the tax rate (￿0).
As pointed out, the tax-rate uncertainty problem (11) has no closed-form
solution. For this reason, we need a numerical analysis to compare the tax-
certainty with the tax-uncertainty case. In doing so, we will use the benchmark
parameter values of Table 1. In line with Dixit and Pindyck (p. 157 and p. 193,
1994; 1999) we set r = ￿ = 0:05 and ￿ = 0:4.14 Furthermore, we assume that
￿ = 3: This means that, given r = 0:05, the default cost is about 10% of the debt
value.15
As we have seen in Figure 1, over the last decade, the average statutory tax
rate has been about 30%. Accordingly, we set ￿0 equal to 0:3. Given the high
heterogeneity of the tax-rate jumps occurred over the past decade, we will assume
that ￿1 ranges from 0:1 to 0:55.16 We will therefore be able to study both the
capital-levy and the tax-competition case.
Let us ￿rst look at the e⁄ects of the tax rate di⁄erential ￿￿ on both the
threshold point and the optimal coupon. Figure 2 shows that both b ￿￿ and C￿
are positively a⁄ected by the tax rate di⁄erential ￿￿. The reasoning behind this
result is as follows. An increase in ￿￿ means that, given ￿0 and ￿, a higher average
tax rate (which must account for both the current rate ￿0 and the expected
future one ￿1) will be levied. The heavier the expected tax burden, the higher
the investment trigger point is (i.e., the later the investment will be undertaken).
Therefore, if ￿￿ > 0, an increase in ￿￿ raises the expected tax burden, and
therefore, causes a delay in investment timing. The opposite is true if ￿￿ < 0.
14The quality of results does not change if we use di⁄erent values of ￿. For further details
see, e.g., Leland (1994).
15This percentage is in line with Branch￿ s (2002) estimates.
16Of course, the quality of results does not change if a di⁄erent value of ￿0 is assumed.










Similarly, an increase in ￿￿ raises the optimal coupon C￿: This is due to
the fact that a higher average tax rate leads to a higher tax bene￿t of interest
deductibility, thereby encouraging borrowing.
Notice that point ￿￿ = 0 describes the tax-rate certainty case. Therefore,
Figure 2 allows us to compare the tax-rate certainty case with the tax-rate un-
certainty one. If a ￿rm foresees a tax cut (￿￿ < 0), both the threshold point and
the optimal coupon are less than under tax-rate certainty. The opposite is true
if ￿￿ > 0.
Figure 2: The optimal values C￿ and b ￿￿ as function of ￿￿:
So far we have focused on the absolute values of ￿ and C. Let us next


















is increasing in ￿￿ (blue line); in other words, a ￿rm￿ s propensity to






, depicted by the purple line,
is constant. It is worth noting that the blue line (tax-uncertainty case) is below
(above) the purple line (tax-certainty case) if ￿￿ < 0 (￿￿ > 0). This means
that when a tax rate is expected to decrease, the expected tax bene￿t of interest
deductibility will be lower and therefore, debt will be less pro￿table than under
tax-rate certainty. The converse is true if ￿￿ > 0: in this case, a ￿rm operating
in a uncertain tax environment is stimulated to raise leverage.
Figure 3: The optimal ratios C￿=b ￿￿ and ￿ C0=￿ ￿￿
0as function of ￿￿:
In Tables 2, 3 and 4 we provide a sensitivity analysis for di⁄erent values of
￿￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿. In order to analyze how a ￿rm￿ s ability to borrow a⁄ects its
investment decisions, we will compare the well-known full-equity ￿nance case
(C = 0), with the optimal-leverage case (i.e., C = C￿). Accordingly, we will
calculate the threshold values under both full-equity ￿nancing (i.e., b ￿￿ (C = 0))
and optimal-leverage ￿nancing (i.e., b ￿￿ (C = C￿)). Moreover, we will calculate
the di⁄erential ￿b ￿￿ ￿ b ￿￿ (C = 0) ￿ b ￿￿ (C = C￿).
1314Let us ￿rst focus on the e⁄ects of tax rate uncertainty (￿) on a ￿rm￿ s choices.
As shown in Table 2, we can see that:
1. for any given ￿, the inequality b ￿￿ (C = C￿) < b ￿￿ (C = 0) holds. As ex-
pected, ￿nancial ￿ exibility allows ￿rms to invest earlier, in order to enjoy
the tax bene￿t of interest deductibility.
2. A similar reasoning holds when ￿￿ = 0. However, in the certainty-case, the
di⁄erential ￿b ￿￿ is quite small. This means that a ￿rm￿ s ability to borrow
allows a ￿rm to invest earlier, although this e⁄ect is almost negligible.
3. When ￿￿ 6= 0, the distortive e⁄ect of tax-rate uncertainty is always larger
in the standard full-equity ￿nancing case. Indeed, the ability to borrow can
substantially smooth the e⁄ects of tax rate uncertainty.
4. Under the capital-levy scenario (i.e., with ￿￿ > 0), the threshold points
b ￿￿ (C = 0) and b ￿￿ (C = C￿) are positively a⁄ected by ￿. The reasoning
behind this result is simple: the higher the probability of a given tax rate
increase, the higher the expected tax burden and the higher a ￿rm￿ s trigger
point is (and hence, the later an investment is made). The opposite is true
in a tax-competition environment (i.e., with ￿￿ < 0): an increase in ￿
reduces b ￿￿.
To sum up, we can say that, when debt ￿nance is allowed, tax-rate uncertainty
(in terms of both a higher di⁄erential ￿￿ and a higher probability) has a smaller
impact on investment timing. For instance, our numerical analysis shows that if
a dramatic tax rate increase (￿1 from 0.3 to 0.55) was expected, its e⁄ect would
be almost negligible for an optimally-leveraged ￿rm. When, instead, a borrowing
constraint is binding and a ￿rm can ￿nance its investment only through equity
issues, the e⁄ect of tax-rate uncertainty is much more signi￿cant.
1516Let us next look at the e⁄ects of both EBIT volatility (￿) and default cost
(￿) on a ￿rm￿ s decisions. Results can be summarized as follows.
1. For any given couple (￿;￿￿) and (￿;￿￿), the di⁄erential ￿b ￿￿ is positive.
Again, we can see that ￿nancial ￿ exibility allows ￿rms to invest earlier in
order to enjoy the tax bene￿t of interest deductibility.
2. For any given value of ￿ and ￿, the value ￿b ￿￿ is U-shaped. This means
that: (i) the di⁄erential ￿b ￿￿ is large when j￿￿j is large, i.e., a ￿rm￿ s ability
to borrow allows to invest much earlier when a large variation of the tax
rate is expected; (ii) the di⁄erential ￿b ￿￿ is minimum for ￿￿ ! 0: In this
case, the e⁄ect of a ￿rm￿ s ability to borrow on investment timing is still
positive, though it is relatively small.
3. Table 3 shows that the positive e⁄ect of ￿ on both thresholds points b ￿￿ (C = 0)
and b ￿￿ (C = C￿) is substantial. This is due to the fact that volatility raises
a ￿rm￿ s option value, with the e⁄ect that the investment is delayed. On
the contrary, Table 4 shows that the e⁄ect of parameter ￿, representing the
unitary cost of default, on b ￿￿ (C = C￿) is almost negligible.
To sum up, we can say that the results of Tables 3 and 4 show that our results
are robust: when debt ￿nance is allowed, tax rate uncertainty has a smaller e⁄ect
on investment timing decision for a wide range of parameter values.
17184 Conclusion
In this article, we have applied a real-option model to study the e⁄ects of tax
rate uncertainty on both investment timing and the optimal capital structure of
a representative ￿rm.
By departing from the relevant literature, which has extensively analyzed
fully equity-￿nanced investment decisions, we have shown that the ability to
borrow allows ￿rms to invest earlier in order to enjoy the tax bene￿t of interest
deductibility. More importantly, we have shown that a highly volatile tax system
may have a negligible impact on investment choices, when ￿rms can choose their
capital structure. This leads us to conclude that debt ￿nance allows a ￿rm to
substantially smooth the distortive e⁄ects of tax-rate uncertainty.
Our results have interesting implications in terms of both empirical analy-
sis and policy decisions. Given our ￿ndings, we can say that when investment
activities are studied, empirical investigation should control for the existence (ab-
sence) of ￿nancial ￿ exibility. Indeed, disregarding the characteristics of ￿nancial
markets would be misleading.
Similarly, the e⁄ect of a hot policy debate on future (and uncertain) tax-
rate changes may have a signi￿cantly negative impact on investment, if ￿rms are
credit-constrained. If however, ￿nancial markets are e¢ cient and hence provide a
su¢ cient amount of resources, the same debate may lead to a negligible impact on
investment, since ￿rms can smooth the e⁄ects of tax-rate uncertainty by optimally
adjusting their capital structure. It is worth noting that we assumed the absence
of any renegotiation of debt. Of course we expect that, whenever renegotiation
is allowed, a ￿rm enjoys a higher degree of ￿ exibility and therefore, the e⁄ect of
tax-rate uncertainty is further mitigated.
In this article we have used other simplifying assumptions, such as the sym-
metric treatment of pro￿ts and losses, as well as the absence of personal taxa-
tion, agency costs and any bargaining process between stakeholders (including
renegotiation and partial conversion of debt into equity). We believe that the
elimination of any of these simplifying assumptions is an interesting topic that
we leave for future research. Finally, the evidence shows that tax uncertainty is
caused by both tax-rate and tax-base changes (e.g., via changes in investment tax
credits and ￿scal depreciation allowances). We therefore believe that a promising
extension of our model would entail the joint analysis of tax-rate and tax-base
uncertainty.
A The value functions
In order to calculate a ￿rm￿ s value function with tax rate uncertainty we must
￿rst focus on the value function after the tax-rate change, i.e., when tax rate is
19￿1. Subsequently, we will deal with the value function under tax rate uncertainty,
i.e., when the current tax rate is ￿0.
A.1 The value function (4)
Using dynamic programming, let us calculate the equity value E1 (￿;C) as a
summation between the net cash ￿ ow (1 ￿ ￿1)(￿ ￿ C), in the short interval dt,
and its future value after the instant dt has passed:
E1 (￿;C) = (1 ￿ ￿1)(￿ ￿ C)dt + e
￿rdt￿ [E1 (￿ + d￿;C)]; (17)
where ￿ [E (￿ + d￿;C)] is the expected value of equity at time t+dt. Expanding
the RHS of (17), applying It￿￿ s Lemma and rearranging gives the following non-
arbitrage condition:





where ￿ ￿ r￿￿, E1￿ ￿ @E
@￿ and E1￿￿ ￿ @2E


































0 are the roots of the characteristic equation ￿(￿) = 1
2￿2￿(￿￿1)+(r￿￿)￿￿r = 0.
Let us next calculate A1 and A2: In the absence of any ￿nancial bubbles, A1
is nil. To calculate A2, we must consider that default occurs when ￿ drops to C,
namely the condition













































Following the same procedure we can write D1 (￿;C) as:
D1 (￿;C) = C + e
￿rdt￿ [D1 (￿ + d￿;C)]:




(1 ￿ ￿1)￿ + (r ￿ ￿)￿D1￿(￿;C) + ￿2
2 ￿2D1￿￿(￿;C) after default,
C + (r ￿ ￿)￿D1￿(￿;C) + ￿2
2 ￿2D1￿￿(￿;C) before default.
(21)
The closed-form solution of (21) is:
D1 (￿;C) =
8
> > > > <












To calculate B2 we use the boundary condition D(0;C) = 0; which means that
when ￿ falls to zero the lender￿ s post-default claim is nil. This implies that
B2 = 0. In the absence of any ￿nancial bubble, we have B1 = D1 = 0. Finally,
to calculate D2 we let the pre-default branch of (22) equate its after-default one,
































The summation of (20) and (24), net of the investment cost I, gives:
















A.2 The value function (5)
Following the same procedure we can calculate the value function before the tax
rate change. Again, we write the value of equity as:
E0 (￿;C) = (1 ￿ ￿0)(￿ ￿ C)+(1 ￿ ￿dt)e
￿rdt￿ [E0 (￿ + d￿;C)]+￿dt￿ [E1 (￿ + d￿;C)]:
Expanding its RHS, applying It￿￿ s Lemma and rearranging gives:






21Let us next subtract (18) from (26) so that:







X (￿;C) ￿ E0 (￿;C) ￿ E1 (￿;C): (28)
Solving (27) gives

















































2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (r ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ (r + ￿) = 0:
Notice that, in the absence of bubbles, we have F1 = 0: Using (28) and (29), and
rearranging, we obtain:
E0 (￿;C) = E1 (￿;C) + X (￿;C)






























Using condition E0 (C;C) = 0 and solving for F2 we can ￿nd










Hence, the value of equity is equal to:
E0 (￿;C) = E1 (￿;C) + X (￿;C) (30)








































22Let us now calculate the value of debt before the tax rate change. As usual,
we can write it as:
D0 (￿;C) = C + (1 ￿ ￿dt)e
￿rdt￿ [D0 (￿ + d￿;C)] + ￿dt￿ [D1 (￿ + d￿;C)]:
Expanding its RHS, applying It￿￿ s Lemma and rearranging gives the following
non-arbitrage condition:




2D0￿￿ (￿;C) + ￿D1 (￿;C):
(31)
Subtracting (21) from (31) gives:






Y (￿;C) ￿ D0 (￿;C) ￿ D1 (￿;C): (33)
The solution of (32) has the following form:
Y (￿;C) =
8
> > > > <









Notice that, after default (but before the tax-rate change), the boundary condi-
tion Y (0;C) = 0 holds. This implies that L2 = 0: Moreover, in the absence of
bubbles, we have L1 = G1 = 0.
Remember that, after default, the lender becomes shareholders. Therefore,






























To ￿nd G2, we let the two branches of the debt function meet at point ￿ = C,












C ￿ ￿C (35)



























Using (30) and (36) we can ￿nally calculate the ￿rm￿ s NPV:


































































B The option functions
B.1 The option function (6)
Using dynamic programming we can write a ￿rm￿ s option to invest under tax
rate certainty as:
O1 (￿;C) = e
￿rdt￿ [O1 (￿ + d￿;C)]:
Expanding its RHS, applying It￿￿ s Lemma and rearranging gives the following
non-arbitrage condition:





As shown in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the general-form solution of (38) is:
O1 (￿;C) = H1￿
￿1; (39)
where H1 is an unknown. To calculate H1, we apply the VMC at the entry
threshold level (￿ = ￿ ￿), i.e.,
V1(￿;C)j￿=￿ ￿ = O1 (￿;C)j￿=￿ ￿ ; (40)
and therefore, obtain



















Substituting (41) into (39), using (40) and rearranging gives the option function
(6).
24B.2 The option function (7)
Following the same procedure, let write a ￿rm￿ s option to invest as:
O0 (￿;C) = (1 ￿ ￿dt)e
￿rdt￿ [O0 (￿ + d￿;C)] + ￿dt￿ [O1 (￿ + d￿;C)]:
Expanding its RHS, applying It￿￿ s Lemma and rearranging gives the following
non-arbitrage condition:




2O0￿￿ (￿;C)+￿O1 (￿;C): (42)
Subtracting (38) from (42) gives











Since Z (0;C) = 0, we obtain
Z (￿;C) = Z1￿
￿1(￿);
and therefore, the option value can be rewritten as follows:




To calculate Z1 we apply the VMC at the threshold point ￿ = b ￿:
V0(￿;C)j￿=b ￿ = O0 (￿;C)j￿=b ￿ : (45)
Using (44) and (45) we obtain:
H1b ￿

































Substituting (47) into (46), using (45) and rearranging gives (7).
25C The ￿rm￿ s choice under tax-rate certainty
Under tax-rate certainty, the ￿rm￿ s problem is (9).
C.1 The solutions




















































￿2 ￿ ￿: (50)
Moreover, from (48) we obtain
￿1
1 ￿ ￿2





and hence, we can rewrite (49) as
￿





































I = 0: (52)






















￿2 > 0: Solution (10) is thus obtained.
26C.2 Comparative statics
Let us next provide some comparative statics for ￿ ￿￿

































































￿2 (￿1 + ￿r) ￿ ￿r

























Let us next study the derivative
@C1




it is always positive.
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